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STRATEGIES FOR SHIFTING 
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
The case of the automobile system 
Johan Schot, Remco Hoogma and Boelie Elzen 
Californian and Dutch efforts to produce electric vehicles are explored and 
compared. Three strategies are put forward that could turn electric vehicles 
from an elusive legend, a plaything, into a marketable product: technology 
forcing creating a market of early promises, experiments geared towards 
niche development and upscaling (strategic niche management), and the 
creation of new alliances (technological nexus) which bring technology, the 
market, regulation and many other factors together. These strategies 
deployed in the Californian and Dutch context are analysed in detail to 
explore their relative strengths and weaknesses and to argue in the end that 
a combined use of all three will increase the chances that the dominant 
technological system will change. The succesful workings of these strategies 
crucially depend on the coupling of the variation and selection processes, 
building blocks for any evolutionary theory of technical change. 
Evolutionary theory lacks understanding of these coupling processes. 
Building on recent insights from the sociology of technology, the authors 
propose a quasi-evolutionary model which underpins the analysis of 
suggested strategies. 
The automobile is highly entrenched in our society and has shaped it deeply. In 1987 
126 000 cars rolled off the assembly lines each working day, and some 400 million 
vehicles invade the world’s streets today.’ These cars are not just artefacts, but 
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represent a technological system where they are tied together with roads, gas 
stations, oil companies, automobile retailers, repair shops, and car drivers, to name 
just a few elements. In Western societies a longstanding love affair with the 
automobile has developed, which has proved to be contagious. Also in non-Western 
countries most people who can afford a car are eager to own one. The phrase The 
Automobile Age, used as a book title by the American historian James J Flink, aptly 
describes the place of the artefact in our world.’ Since the end of the 196Os, 
however, the car has lost its innocence. The automobile has been criticized for 
causing many persistent problems. Dependence on oil from the Middle East, unsafe 
cities, environmental degradation and traffic jams, to name the most important ones. 
Apparently, these problems have not affected car sales. The viability of the 
automobile system has hardly diminished.j 
In evolutionary theories of technical change automobile history is often 
portrayed as an exemplar of lock-in. In 1895 the gasoline powered car was held to 
be the least promising option. Steam and electric vehicles contained attractive 
futures. Due to a series of circumstances gasoline got the lead and subsequently 
proved to be unassailable, so the story goes.” Rene Kemp has summarized factors 
that make existing technological systems, including the automobile system, so hard 
to change.5 Prevailing systems have gone through a series of incremental 
improvements and have gained precise user understanding. To solve compatibility 
problems a number of complementary technologies have been developed. Misfits 
with the societal and political system have been accommodated. 
The question then arises, how can radical new technologies ever emerge, since 
they will always be confronted with a broad range of barriers-technologically and 
economically superior competitors and a hostile selection-environment? Research 
shows that it is impossible to isolate any single factor, and that accidental causation 
has a role to play as well. Perhaps there is nothing special about the fact that new 
technologies emerge. The variety and richness of potential alternatives are 
astonishing. In the automobile case, hydrogen, natural gas and various bio-fuels 
compete with gasoline, and electric motors provide another propulsion system. The 
question then becomes, how do new technologies compete and gain momentum or 
how do they get selected? How are they protected against the myopia of the existing 
technological system? 
One possibility is that the existing system loses viability because the selection 
environment is changing and provides new types of challenge which cannot be met 
with the dominant technology, or require advances which are only possible at too 
much marginal cost. This is certainly not true for the automobile. Industry perceives 
many new promising technological options within the dominant paradigm of the 
internal combustion engine which will reduce many problems substantially. For 
example, experts assess that existing engines could run about 40% more 
economically.’ Another possibility is that new technologies use a niche that protects 
them against too harsh selection and provides space to grow. Laboratories provide 
such a space, but technologies need to survive in the market place. Sometimes the 
existing market geography provides niches too. Automobiles were first used by the 
aristocracy (in Germany and France) who were eager to develop an alternative to 
mass transport which had broken their hegemony on the road, based on horse 
carriages. Many disadvantages were taken for granted: driving automobiles was 
dangerous, uncomfortable, unreliable and noisy.’ Their advantages, notably their 
ability to climb all hills and drive long distances, made them attractive for physicians 
who had to visit patients living in remote places. This provided yet another niche 
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market. Adoption by US farmers, who were seeking ways to overcome their relative 
isolation, turned the automobile into a mass product.8 
In this article we explore strategies for shifting technological systems, using the 
automobile as a case. We focus on the question of how to get the electric vehicle on 
to the road in sufficient numbers.’ Although the developed insights and strategies 
can be taken up by firms, pressure groups and others, we take a government 
perspective. Our starting point is the taxonomy of strategies developed by Schot (but 
see Rip and Van den Belt as well).” On the basis of a quasi-evolutionary model of 
technical change Schot distinguishes three strategies: 
(1) Development of alternative variations. Governments could try to stimulate 
technologies which are not developed in the market place. Examples are wind 
and solar power energy technologies. If not handled carefully, such protected 
variations cannot survive in the real selection environment. Thus, a gradual 
introduction of a new option is necessary. Following Rip, we label this strategy 
strategic niche management.” In this article we explore experiments as a way to 
shape strategic niche management. 
(2) Modification of the selection environment through regulation and other 
instruments. We explore the viability of strict regulation with the intention to 
force industry to develop new technologies and bring them to the market. 
Stringent regulation is important for the creation of new expectations about 
viable technological futures. 
(3) Creation or utilization of institutional links, called the technological nexus, 
between places that produce variations and their selection environments. Such a 
nexus helps translate selection pressure into criteria and specifications used in 
the design process. Schot has explored examples such as marketing, 
environmental and quality departments within firms. We explore whether and 
how new networks which develop around new technological options could 
effectively serve a nexus function. 
Our aim is to elaborate these strategies and gain more insight into their relative 
strengths and weaknesses. We argue that a combined use of all three will increase 
the chances that the dominant technological system will change. 
All three strategies are being tried out for electric vehicles. In the USA the 
Californian state government has developed a technology forcing programme. This 
has led to a number of other initiatives, including experiments with electric vehicles 
and the formation of new actors and networks. In Europe the experimental route has 
been developed in the Netherlands, Germany, France and Sweden. Through a 
process geared towards niche development and upscaling, participants in these 
experiments hope to develop a new market. In this article we draw only on empirical 
material from the Dutch case. 
In order to prepare and deepen the presentations of our empirical material, we 
first present the theoretical background of our argument. We argue that simple 
evolutionary models are necessarily incomplete because variation and selection 
processes, the building blocks of any evolutionary model, are envisaged as 
independent instead of being coupled. To emphasize the intentional and strategic 
character of this coupling process we prefer to speak of quasi-evolution. Focusing on 
the coupling process is the key to assessing the prospects of existing policies and to 
identifying ways of coming up with advice on how to upgrade these policies. 
Moreover, it allows us to overcome the mechanical and deterministic overtones of 
evolutionary economics noted by Green et al.” 
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Quasi-evolution and strategies for change 
A common weakness of the evolutionary approach is its neglect of crucial 
intermediary processes occurring between variation and selection. Insights 
developed in the recent sociology of technical change can help to remedy this flaw. 
It is not our intention to summarize evolutionary and sociological theories at length. 
That is satisfactorily done elsewhere.13 We focus on clarification of the coupling 
between variation and selection. 
Evolutionary theory starts by creating a split between variation processes (in 
which technologies develop) and selection processes.‘4 The variation process is a 
search process characterized by trial and error, and uncertainty. Various technical 
options are developed, but not every conceivable variation is part of the 
development process. Restricting the number of variations that are tried out emerges 
from what Dosi calls a technological ‘paradigm’. This concept is defined as a set of 
rules or heuristics that indicate what the relevant problems are and in which 
direction the solution should be sought. The effect of the paradigm is, therefore, that 
the search process is driven in a certain direction and does not take up directions that 
do not fit within the paradigm. Selection between the technical options generated 
during variation takes place in two ways. Ex post selection occurs when the 
variations (generated options) are exposed to the selection of a market. The ensuing 
process, with some options succeeding while others are eliminated, can be 
described by the Darwinian concept of survival of the fittest. The variation is 
stochastic (or blind), and like orthodox Darwinian selection the generation of 
variants takes place independently of their subsequent selection. The second form of 
selection, ex ante, occurs when influence from the selection environment is exerted 
on the generation of variations. Ex ante selection resembles a Lamarckian process, 
where an organism generates variations that are favoured by its environment (in 
contrast to random mutations generating variations blindly). For firms and other 
variation generators this form of selection takes place when they anticipate possible 
selection pressures from the market or other sources. Nelson and Winter (and 
following their lead, other evolutionary economists) have replaced the narrow 
concept of the ‘market’ with the broader concept of the selection environment. The 
latter concept embraces not only the neo-classical market (structure and size of 
supply and demand as well as prices) but also all kinds of institutional factors 
(regulation, relationship between employers and employees, political structure) and 
even geographical factors. For their extended concept of selection environment, the 
same ex ante selection by anticipation occurs. 
In contrast to evolutionary economists, constructivist sociologists deny the 
possibility of making a difference between variation and independent selection. For 
these analysts-including, as the central strands, actor network theory, system 
approach, and SCOT-content and form are given to technical developments 
simultaneously with the construction of their context.15 Each variation entails a script 
or scenario16 which, besides technical aspects, also includes social, political and 
environmental aspects. A classic example (again!) is the automobile. Callon 
described how engineers at Electricite de France (EDF) designed an electric car 
simultaneously with the whole environment in which such a car should function.” 
For example, the engineers had to encompass in their planning not only the 
technical aspects but also government regulation, research programmes, and motor 
manufacturers’ production. This implies that engineers have to concern themselves 
not only with technology (batteries, fuel cells etc) but also with all kinds of economic 
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and political aspects, elements of the selection environment in evolutionary 
economics. Actors who develop technology are designated as heterogenous 
engineers in the actor network approach. ” They must realize both the technical side 
of their design, and also its social side. They must thus try to put a whole range of 
heterogenous elements in place in order to be able to realize their design. To put it 
another way, there is no independent variation and selection (the building blocks of 
the evolutionary model) but rather coevolution of both technology and the selection 
environment. Technologies appear as actor networks of heterogenous elements. The 
analysis must then focus on how links are made. 
These insights developed within the sociology of technology enable us to 
criticize the way evolutionary economics tends to create a split, and conceptualize 
interaction between variation and selection processes. First, we notice that 
descriptions and analysis of variations only consist of technical details. Evolutionary 
economists do not acknowledge the heterogenous character of technology which is 
so central to sociological analysis. Second, they do not elucidate how variation 
interacts with the selection environment. They ignore how variations themselves 
change their selection environment, as is visible in all actor-centred analyses by 
sociologists, who portray restless actors bending the world to their will. Finally, their 
conceptualization of the influence of the selection environment on the variation 
process lacks a necessary sociological dimension. It does not become clear how this 
process actually works. Dosi has developed the notion of ex ante selection, which 
involves the redirection of heuristics, but fails to clarify how firms anticipate 
selection pressures, through what kind of dynamics. 
To capture the valuable insights of both evolutionary and sociological accounts 
of technical change and simultaneously give substance to a perspective which 
analyses the coupling and decoupling processes that occur, we prefer a 
quasi-evolutionary model.” The key feature of this model is its focus on the way 
variation and selection processes are partly independent and yet coupled. The 
starting point for a quasi-evolutionary model is the search processes which are 
embedded in heuristics. These search processes and the variations pursued are 
heterogenous by their very nature. The products of the search processes encounter 
selection environments, which have their own dynamics which are only partly 
determined by the variation process. Actors do try to anticipate and influence the 
selection environment. Until now three major coupling mechanisms have been 
identified: (1) voicing and articulation of expectations; (2) shaping of the 
technological nexus, institutional carriers which act on the variation and selection 
process simultaneously; (3) creation of niches in which new variations are exposed 
to selection pressure in a controlled way and thus protected against too harsh 
selection. The occurrence of these coupling mechanisms parallels the taxonomy of 
strategies provided above. As we noted for the strategies, they may occur together. 
The Californian initiative 
The situation in California 2” offers a good example of the combination of strategies 
and mechanisms, and allows us to speculate about effects. The single most important 
stimulus for increased interest in electric vehicles (EVs) was the ambitious clean air 
standards set in California in 1988. Among a variety of other measures the California 
Air Resources Board (CARB) attempts to force manufacturers to develop cleaner cars. 
These attempts consist of the establishment of four progressively more stringent 
categories of vehicles: transitional low-emission vehicles (or TLEVs), low-emission 
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vehicles (or LEVs), ultra-low-emission vehicles (or ULEVs) and zero-emission 
vehicles (or ZEVs). Manufacturers may produce any combination of the first three 
groups as long as they meet increasingly stringent fleet average emission 
requirements each year. The proportion of ZEVs is prescribed as of 1998. In that year 
2% of each manufacturer’s passenger cars and light trucks must be ZEVs. This 
applies only to manufacturers who sell more than 35000 vehicles per year in 
California, which is the case for most US and Japanese manufacturers. The 
percentage of ZEVs increases to 5% in 2001/2002, and 10% in 2003. In that year 
intermediate-sized manufacturers (mostly European) must also offer ZEVs. In 2003 it 
is expected that 400000 ZEVs will be on the road. The Californian approach does 
not prescribe or advocate one specific solution. They only judge the environmental 
quality of each vehicle. It is for each manufacturer to decide which solution they will 
rely on. However, it is clear that only the electric vehicle will be able to meet the 
zero-emission requirement in 1998. 
Much of the Californian interest in EVs stems from the failure to meet federal and 
state air-quality standards in many areas. Due to specific climatological and 
geological circumstances, combined with a high population density, the atmosphere 
in southern California is one of the most polluted in the world. For example, in Los 
Angeles the standards for ozone are exceeded on about half the days in the year. 
People suffer directly, which makes them prepared to support stringent state policies. 
In addition, California has built up a tradition of being first in enacting legislation that 
forces industry to curtail automobile emissions. Positive crankcase ventilation 
systems to reduce hydrocarbon discharge were required on all cars sold in California 
beginning with the 1963 model year. Exhaust control devices to reduce emissions of 
carbon monoxide, oxide of nitrogen, and lead compounds became mandatory in 
California beginning with the 1966 model year.2’ It took Europe more than two 
decades to adopt similar measures. California hopes to reduce local emissions 
substantially through forcing EVs on the market. Even if emissions from power plants 
generating the electricity are considered, ‘total chain’ emissions in California are still 
substantially lower than from internal-combustion vehicles (ICVs). This is primarily 
due to the stringent emission control standards already in place for power plants. The 
result of these regulations is a strong bias towards natural gas use in power plants and 
away from coal or oil.” 
Economic interests are important too to understand the California initiative. 
California does not have a major domestic car industry that can disqualify the 
measures as unattainable or negative for the local economy. On the contrary the 
State of California sees the production of EVs and its components as an important 
future industrial activity for local military industry seeking civilian markets and local 
new innovative firms. New industries would profit from an enormous local car 
market, absorbing about 4% of world car production or up to 10% of the production 
of specific manufacturers. Its market is important in qualitative terms as well. Most 
automobile manufacturers believe that new trends are becoming visible first in 
California.L3 
A bandwagon of initiatives 
The California mandate has led to and is supported by a number of other local and 
national policy initiatives. In 1988 Los Angeles started an international competition 
for the sale of at least 5000 electric vans and 5000 electric passenger cars by 19%. 
This ‘Los Angeles Initiative’ resulted in a request for proposals which was distributed 
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worldwide. Three companies were selected from the 18 that responded. One (Clean 
Air Transport) is currently under contract to begin to design and manufacture the 
vehicle designated the LA301. 24 In 1991 another initiative emerged. The City 
Council of Los Angeles formed a task force on Electric Vehicle Infrastructure. The 
purpose of this task force is to review all local opportunities to facilitate and 
encourage the use of EVs, and to recommend appropriate local laws and 
programmes. This has resulted in several actions to stimulate use of EVs. The 
following actions have been taken:25 
l building code requirements for new constructions to ensure that houses have 
adequate EV charging facilities; 
l a requirement that the city provide EV charging facilities; 
l a requirement that employers with more than 100 parking spaces provide 
preferential parking and/or charging facilities; 
l incentives for airport-area hotels and car rental companies to use EVs as shuttle 
vans and a requirement that LA airport use EVs as a percentage of the airport fleet; 
l a requirement that all park-and-ride lots have a percentage of spaces ready for EV 
use. 
At the federal level a number of initiatives have been taken to support the Californian 
mandate. Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 the federal government will give a 
10% income tax credit on the price of an EV, up to a maximum of $4000. Under the 
same provision a tax credit up to $100000 is provided for building refuelling 
stations. In addition $50 million is available for subsidies to vehicle demonstration 
projects and $40 million for infrastructure development. The Energy Policy Act also 
requires government fleets and fuel providers to start converting their fleets to 
alternative fuels beginning in 1996 or, in the case of electric vehicles, in 1998.*” 
General Motors, Ford and Chrysler (‘The Big Three’) find the ZEV mandate 
problematic.L7 They expect that the low performance of EVs combined with their 
high price will make it impossible to produce a product that can be sold in sufficient 
numbers to meet the 1998 2% mandate. They are asking for more time to develop 
better batteries. To push battery technology they participate in the US Advanced 
Battery Consortium (USABC), formally established in January 1991, that has targeted 
the development of a battery which will perform better and cost less than existing 
ones by the mid-1990s. Membership includes GM, Ford, Chrysler, the Electric 
Power Research Institute (EPRI) and some of its member utilities. In addition USABC 
and the US Department of Energy signed a Cooperative Agreement. The objective is 
to accelerate the EV market potential by advancing the most promising battery 
technologies. USABC has quantified mid-term and long-term objectives to be met by 
the end of 1994. The intent is to develop an advanced battery which meets the 
mid-term criteria, for which pilot prototype production can start in 1994, and to 
demonstrate the design feasibility of an advanced battery which meets the long-term 
criteria. The consortium will also help to achieve commonality of standards for 
certain aspects of batteries in order to make them more interchangeable.28 Next to 
batteries all three companies have developed prototypes for testing purposes. GM 
will build SO Impacts (a purpose-built two-seater) which will be used by various 
customers. The tests started in spring 1994 and will last two years. Chrysler and Ford 
have taken a different approach. They have converted existing vehicles into electric 
ones. 
For electric utilities transport is a new market that in their view needs to be 
developed.Lg Creating an EV infrastructure is one of the primary concerns. They 
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invest in research projects on designing and prototyping charging facilities. Electric 
utilities challenge the perspective of the existing automobile industry who are 
looking for mass markets to sell thousands of vehicles. In their view electric vehicles 
will have to emerge out of smaller niches. An initial niche might be formed by users 
who would accept current state-of-the-art technology. The aim is to use the 
experiences of the initial users to improve the next series. The utilities see an 
important role for themselves in this process. They try to serve as an intermediate 
between vehicle development on the one hand and collecting practical experience 
on the other. Their initiatives include stimulating R&D in areas they feel are 
neglected, testing technologies, buying EVs for their own fleets and/or put them into 
the hands of users to gain experience. One of their undertakings is the so-called 
EV-5000 effort. This is a nationwide programme to put 5000 EVs on the road by 
1996. To get more regular users interested, Californian utilities are considering 
providing financial incentives as well. They are discussing a rebate of $1500 to any 
EV purchaser. The money will come from the regular budget, and thus needs to be 
paid for by all customers. In addition they have proposed a lower electricity rate for 
EVs if the EV were to be charged off-peak. 
In summary, the approach taken in California is a combination of technology 
forcing standards and facilitating initiatives taken by others, including funding of key 
technological developments and experiments. Explicitly, the authorities have chosen 
not to reduce mobility, for example through taxing gasoline or car ownership. They 
rely on new technological advances which is so much part of American culture.” 
The initiatives discussed have defined a future space and market for a new technical 
artefact-the ZEV. 
A speculative market ofpromises to be realized 
Due to the Californian initiative the EV story has changed dramatically. It turned the 
EV from a toy and R&D project with no future, an elusive legend, into a marketable 
product. For decades the age of the electric car has been announced. In 1968 the US 
Society of Automotive Engineers published a feasibility study on a city car that would 
reduce emissions substantially. According to this study it would be possible to build 
small automobiles which produce negligible amounts of pollution. The proposed 
vehicle was a hybrid consisting of an electric engine and a small internal combustion 
engine. They expected that as a result of technological progress in the domain of 
batteries it would be possible to drive entirely on electricity within 10 years. The cost 
of the hybrid was expected to be comparable with the price of a Volkswagen.-” In 
1973 Electricitt! de France (EDF) presented a plan for the introduction of electric 
vehicles.‘2 In 1979 General Motors presented an electrical version of its Chevette, 
and claimed that within 5-10 years commercial production would start. In 1990 
10% of total production would consist of electric models.3-’ However, until now the 
electric car is not produced in large quantities, although research work continues. 
What happened? First, pressure that came from the 1970s’ energy crisis faded 
away. This pressure was partly based on the expectation that shortage of oil would 
cause major problems and lead to a high gasoline price. This turned out not to be the 
case. Automobile sales grew to new heights and the use of the catalytic converter 
promised to solve many environmental problems.‘4 Second, it turned out to be 
impossible to overcome certain disadvantages of EVs compared to conventional 
cars, despite substantial R&D investment. Their acceleration is slower, their top 
speed is lower, and their range per charge is much shorter, typically between 70 km 
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and 140 km for city traffic. Technologically, the battery was identified as the most 
problematic component. Performance of electric vehicles is highly dependent on it. 
Batteries are also problematic because they are the largest single cost item, making 
electric vehicles very expensive when compared to ICVs. In the Netherlands, the 
electric version of the Peugeot J5, for instance, costs about $32000 (including 
lead-acid battery and charging equipment) while the gasoline variant costs about 
$18 OO0.j5 New types of batteries, such as sodium-sulphur batteries are even more 
expensive: the one Ford uses in its Ecostar model costs $46000. This price could 
only come down if they were to be produced in large volume. Another related 
problem area is expected lifespan of batteries. Current lead-acid batteries have an 
average lifetime of 2-3 years.” The lifetime of advanced batteries has yet to be 
established. 
At the beginning of the mid-l 980s the EV was removed from the R&D agenda of 
most firms and governments or considered to be a low priority. Some firms and 
governments were still working on it, mainly to preserve their knowledge base, and 
they hoped for spin-offs for regular automobile R&D. This has changed dramatically 
as a result of the California state legislation. The legislation defined a future market in 
California that is expected to open up in 1998. In the meantime, a speculative 
market of early promises and expectations about new developments has emerged. 
On this market new options are offered and selected. Firms develop R&D projects, 
partly to influence this market. A good illustration is the development of the 
Environmental Concept Car by Volvo through its design centre located in California. 
The Environmental Concept Car is a hybrid combining gas turbine and battery 
technology. This car is developed by Volvo ‘as a vehicle for discussion’.” Volvo 
wants to push big family cars and to preclude a new future in which small electric 
city cars will dominate the market. In the advertisement material the rhetorical 
question is asked: ‘Could you accept a small battery-powered car just for short trips, 
for example, or will you still need a family car designed for efficiency, versatility and 
safety?‘j8 Other automobile manufacturers have developed their prototypes as well, 
focusing mainly on battery performance. Although they claim that EVs will not be 
able to replace ICVs because their customers will not buy it, they feel forced to act on 
the market of early promises, put up their expectations and engage themselves in 
R&D projects. The electric utilities argue the other way round. They point to new 
developments. New charging technology may double or triple battery life, and 
improved lead-acid batteries may boost range. Quick charge stations could recharge 
batteries in 15 minutes. In addition to batteries, advanced flywheels could become 
an interesting energy storage technology. Finally, new kinds of vehicles are explored 
and negotiated. Some concepts are deliberately introduced to create a new class of 
vehicles which is expected to bypass possible initial resistance grounded in 
comparison with existing vehicles. Initially, most participants looked at 
high-performance vehicles that could go on highways, as the automobile industry is 
still doing. But over the past four years a lot of other options have been suggested 
including so-called neighbourhood vehicles, station cars that could be used at the 
end of transit lines for renting or leasing, commuter cars that might only go 25 or 30 
mph and larger vehicles like battery-powered buses and electric trolley buses. 
An important feature of the market of early promises is that many small and new 
firms start to trade on it. The existence of the market is a prerequisite for getting 
funding, thus these firms have an interest in developing it further. And they do so by 
developing new options and concepts. They expect to be able to produce for the 
niche markets that will evolve, but most of them do not expect to be able to sell for 
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mass markets. They miss financial strength and distribution facilities. Some of these 
new firms act as central nodes in the new market. They perceive their own role as 
platforms. They act as a meeting ground for a large variety of organizations including 
industry, utilities, government agencies, educational and research institutions. Two 
examples are CALSTART and the Electricar-Synergy EV Group.3g CALSTART is a 
non-profit firm which envisages the creation of a new Californian industry in 
advanced transportation systems and technologies. California will benefit from that 
new industry by achieving clean air and a more efficient means of transportation. 
CALSTART has several programmes including building a showcase EV vehicle with a 
$7.4 million budget. This car has travelled to many car shows to announce what is 
possible in California in the field of components development. By early 1993 
CALSTART had installed 80 public charging stations and a neighbourhood 
programme for developing and testing consumer acceptance. Unlike CALSTART, 
Electricar-Synergy is a company that is actually seeking to produce EVs for the 
near-term market. The strategy of this company is to bring various needed elements 
such as technology, producers, consumers and regulators together in an attempt to 
create a win-win situation. Hence the name Synergy. 
The market of early promises is reinforced by a bandwagon of policy measures 
outside California. Several federal measures have already been noted. Two states in 
the USA (Massachusetts and New York) decided to adopt the Californian rules, while 
11 other states plus the District of Columbia have also committed themselves to 
adopting the Californian rather than the federal emission standards for cars4” Several 
European cities are considering strong initiatives too, mainly banning ICVs from their 
centres or reserving special parking lots for EVs. In Sweden a procurement 
programme has been developed, securing a market of 300 cars for a supplier that 
meets the criteria established.4’ Partly in reaction to the Californian hype, Japan has 
quantified plans for the introduction of EVs. In October 1991 the Electric Vehicle 
Council of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) set up the 
‘Electric Vehicle Marketing Programme’ with objectives projected into the year 
2000. The programme targets that by that year 200000 EVs will be introduced into 
cities.4’ 
The Dutch initiative 
In the NetherlandsA an attempt to introduce EVs is also being made, but the Dutch 
route is quite different from the Californian one. In the Netherlands the approach is 
to look for and develop specific market niches for EVs through the coordinated effort 
of all important actors. This is done within a multi-year programme coordinated by 
an organization called NOVEM which implements and develops R&D programmes 
for the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs. The R&D programme on the rational use 
of energy is one of them. In November 1990 a so-called ‘practice experiment’ was 
started in which prospective EV users were given a chance to use an EV for a number 
of weeks in their regular activities. NOVEM felt that this test was unique since earlier 
tests were done with experts. Prospective users had never been involved. The aim 
was to feed results back into the design process and influence the further 
development of EVs. Together with the practice experiment, NOVEM also initiated a 
feasibility study. The study was funded by NOVEM, the Environment Ministry and 
the Ministry of Transport and Public Works. The goal was to analyse three major 
issues: (1) the value of EVs to specific users; (2) the impact of EVs on use of energy 
and the environment; (3) possible contributions from Dutch industry to EV 
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production. To guide and evaluate the results, a Steering Committee was formed, 
which consists of several ministries, NOVEM and electric utilities. 
After the initial problems of finding vehicles were overcome, several cars could 
be tested in the practice experiment. These included two Volkswagen Jettas and a 
Chrysler Voyager (a small van) as well as a Volkswagen Transporter. When the cars 
were offered, the organizers did not have much difficulty in finding companies 
willing to test an EV for a couple of weeks or months for their own use. Many of them 
saw it as an interesting option to show their employees and the general public that 
they were ‘environment-friendly’. There was substantial interest from the press, 
especially the local press. The experiment became known more widely and as a 
result many organizations became interested in testing an EV, like the ANWB (the 
Dutch automobile association) and various municipal bodies. An example of the 
latter is the city of Amsterdam. The municipality of Amsterdam has held a 
referendum among its inhabitants in 1992 on the basis of which measures are now 
being worked out substantially to reduce traffic in the inner city. These measures 
should make the city more friendly for walking and biking, and reduce pollution. lt 
would, however, not bring noise levels down below standards set by national 
legislation. Electric vehicles would do so while at the same time reducing local 
pollution further. The city of Amsterdam, and especially its environment department, 
were therefore very interested in EVs. They took part in the practice experiment by 
testing one of the vehicles for a while and intended to investigate, as a next step, 
factors that would influence acceptance of EVs by consumers. 
Findings of the Dutch experiment 
The practical part of the experiment ended in December 1991. It produced a wealth 
of results from a broad variety of users while the feasibility study gave some insight 
into the general possibilities for EVs in the Netherlands. In the feasibility study, 
questionnaires were sent to a broad variety of prospective users to assess the 
economic possibilities of EVs. The results of the experiment can be characterized as 
a series of articulation processes. 
First: articulation of the technology involved. A number of technical problems 
were identified. The sodium-sulphur batteries allowed for considerably better 
performance but it was evident that they were not yet fully developed. Some needed 
repair while the fact that they operate at 300°C necessitates a more complicated (and 
therefore more expensive) technology. Problems also appeared in keeping the 
battery at that temperature. The high temperature is also a disadvantage from the 
overall energy-consumption point of view. Furthermore, heavy vehicles would need 
a hybrid drive to offer additional power to accelerate. 
Second: articulation of user requirement and needs. The driving behaviour of 
the driver had a considerable influence on the range per battery charge. Careful 
driver instruction, therefore, can lead to substantial gains. Drivers were highly 
positive about the behaviour of the vehicles (vehicle dynamics). They found that EVs 
allowed for quiet, simple and relaxed driving. EV drivers developed a new sense of 
what car driving is about. In the final report this was labelled the ‘electric driving 
feeling’. Surprisingly, the needed adjustment to the restricted range turned out not be 
a problem. Drivers started to plan their mobility in other ways. One important result 
of the practice experiment was that in the frequent interaction between the various 
parties a clearer picture of the prospective user was created. Unlike in California, in 
the Netherlands EVs are not seen as cars for private use. In the course of the 
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experiment more and more consensus developed that in the Netherlands ‘fleet 
owners’ should be the users, ie organizations possessing a number of vehicles that 
are used for various applications in which the disadvantages of EVs (lower speed, 
slower acceleration, shorter range) are not crucial. Examples would be taxi 
companies, service companies, city-distribution centres, wholesalers, etc. 
Third: articulation of regulatory constraints. Under the current Dutch road tax 
system EVs fall under a ‘rest’-category which has the highest rate of all identified 
categories. Furthermore taxes increase with the weight of the vehicle which due to 
the heavy batteries is a disadvantage for EVS.~~ 
Fourth: articulation of ways the Dutch industry could profit from a new EV 
market. Key industries such as automobile manufacturing and battery production are 
lacking in the Netherlands, but some companies would profit from developing 
components such as diesel-electric transmission and flywheels. Finally: articulation 
of environmental effects. During the experiment the energy consumption by the EVs 
was measured in detail. 
The results of the practice experiment were favourably evaluated and NOVEM 
decided to start a follow-on experiment that would look more into the exploitation 
and maintenance of use of EVs. Fleet owners would be offered to lease and test a 
certain number of EVs in their fleet. To this end, a number of vehicles was built that 
took into account some of the results of the first experiment. The follow-on 
experiment, therefore, is aiming at imitating ‘real life’ more closely both in terms of 
vehicles used as well as in terms as the setting in which they are tested. 
Comparison of the Californian and Dutch initiatives 
In California, at the start the problem was primarily defined as a technological 
problem. What should be developed was a so-called ZEV that could be widely used. 
Taken for granted was that everybody has the right to possess his or her own private 
car and that many families have two or even more cars. The problem then became to 
develop a policy that would stimulate the development and use of ZEVs for as many 
applications as possible to create a mass market. A technology forcing mandate 
appeared to be an obvious route to go. This mandate led to a bandwagon of new 
initiatives including experiments to stimulate increasing adoption. New firms such as 
CALSTART and Synergy entered the scene. These firms act as a technological nexus, 
bringing together variation generators and selectors and engaging themselves in a 
process of specifying design and selection-environment requirements (including 
requirements for infrastructure and the development of new user concepts). 
In the Dutch situation, people’s mobility was less taken for granted. A broader 
range of options then presented itself to reduce pollution, including increasing 
gasoline prices and other taxes. From this broader perspective some defined EVs as a 
non-solution (even if it were the owner’s only car) as it does not reduce mobility. The 
various ministries, however, and other actors saw EVs as an attractive alternative 
among a variety of others when it was targeted at a specific market niche. Especially 
in the city ICVs perform poorly from the pollution viewpoint due to cold-engine 
inefficiencies, frequent acceleration/deceleration, inefficiency at low speeds, 
inefficiencies of the catalytic converter, etc. In such an environment EVs could 
become an attractive alternative. The experiment was designed in such a way that a 
broad learning process was enacted involving many parties. The learning process is 
divided in a graded sequence of phases allowing for step-by-step upscaling. The 
steering committee of the Dutch practice experiment acted as a platform to evaluate 
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results, specify requirements and mobilize resources to bring the EV on the targeted 
niche market, it developed into a nexus, albeit a temporary one. 
How to evaluate these initiatives? Until now, both the Dutch and Californian 
initiatives appear to be a success within their own context. Our main concern is, do 
they promise to unlock the automobile system? More specific, what kind of evidence 
can be collected on the effectiveness of technology forcing, experimentation and 
technological nexus formation for introducing EVs in large numbers? 
Influencing the car system 
Technology forcing 
Clearly, the Californian legislation triggered a lot of innovative activity, both from 
smaller companies and from the large automobile manufacturers. The Californian 
initiative promises a sizeable market and if the large companies will not offer a ZEV 
by 1998 they are not allowed to sell any product at all anymore. Research from other 
cases shows that regulation consisting of stringent fixed standards settled for a long 
period of time indeed induces innovation, while the absence of regulation or the 
expectation that regulations will change hampers innovation substantially.45 The 
certainty provided for a longer period of time allows industry to adjust its investments 
and R&D policies. Technology-forcing approaches, thus, look like a successful 
method for stimulating the development of cleaner automobiles (or transport). 
However, experiences with earlier attempts of technology forcing also lead to 
some caution. Technology forcing induces a strategic interaction process between 
industry and government. If industry thinks it can make a delay without being 
punished in the end, it will follow that route. White has analysed the introduction of 
the Clean Air Act in the 1970s which contained technology-forcing standards for cars 
as well. Industry used exemptions provided and was able to delay the introduction of 
new technologies substantially.46 This process is clearly visible in this case as well. 
The automobile industry has announced on many occasions that they will not be 
able to deliver a ZEV that can be sold to customers by 1998. They argue that it would 
already take all their energy even to deliver cars that would meet the ULEV standards 
of the mandate. Another strategy is to argue that EVs are not clean because they 
cause pollution elsewhere and thus it would be more effective to trigger innovation 
in other directions. 
On the basis of the work of Ashford, Ayers and Stone it could be argued that 
governments should follow a ‘fail-soft’ strategy.47 Government agencies must be 
strict to create a technology-forcing effect. At the same time, however, if industry 
shows good faith efforts and still fails to meet the standards, they must not be 
punished for non-compliance. If firms expect to get punishment even if they have 
done their utmost best, they will fight regulation. The dilemma for any 
technology-forcing approach is thus how to keep the regulation pressure high while 
at the same time ensuring constructive reactions from industry. We argue that 
experiments could help to circumvent this dilemma. 
Experiments 
A new product like the EV confronts the selection environment with a set of 
unfamiliar possibilities. New ideas need to be developed how to understand the 
product. Experiments provide space for the development of such ideas. These ideas 
cover a broad range of aspects-technology, user needs, infrastructure, needed 
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production and maintenance facilities and effects. ideas become articulated during 
the experiment in a dynamic way. Electric utilities learn about what service they 
need to provide, users learn about what they want or need. A striking feature of most 
of these experiments is how initially a strong focus on existing structures prevails. 
EVs need to match ICVs. This changed because new vehicle concepts and new 
mobility concepts were developed. The development of such new concepts depends 
crucially on experience gained. Another important feature of these experiments is 
their phased character which allows for learning feedback and upscaling. 
Thus, if an experiment is well designed it is the appropriate means for bringing 
about needed articulation processes and gaining necessary experience. Such an 
introduction strategy for new technologies we label strategic niche management. We 
define it as follows: the controlled development and breakdown of protected spaces 
for new technical applications aiming at market introduction. The protection against 
early selection can never be complete, but concerns selected aspects. Instead of 
protection one could also use the term selective exposure to the environment. 
Strategic niche management is a process in which a new technology and the existing 
environment can adjust to each other, because the creation of the niches changes the 
selection environment. 
However, a weakness of experiments is that it is difficult to scale the niche 
ubhow to break down created protection while preserving technological 
developments? The main barrier in the case of EVs is the scale of use and production. 
A small scale not only implies high production costs of vehicles and infrastructure, it 
also means that for instance a network for service and maintenance is less likely to be 
organized. In some experiments upscaling is a defined goal, for which phases are 
designed in which the scale is increased. Other experiments are designed to have 
broad exposure of the technology to a wider public, for instance by organizing open 
days or exhibitions for the general public. Through such initiatives EVs become 
better known, thus increasing user understanding. The problem of upscaling 
remains, however. The experiment is a protected and artificial space that still can be 
dissolved, it is often no more than a temporary meeting ground. This is for instance 
what happened with EV development in the 1970s. After the oil crises there was a 
high interest in electric vehicles and in several countries experiments were started to 
develop them to reduce the countries’ oil dependency. Temporarily the high oil 
prices created pressure for bringing alternatives on the market, but when the prices 
went down again the interest in alternatives, including EVs, vanished. 
Experiments have another weakness as well: they may create an exclusive 
focus. Experiments could become a prison when firms and institutes consider it as an 
obligatory point of passage and discourage other new initiatives. This happened to 
some extent in the Netherlands. Participants of the experiment did not allow other 
initiatives to come about. 
To overcome both weaknesses experiments need some outside pressure, and 
this could come from technology-forcing regulation. Through embedding 
experiments in a technology-forcing strategy, experiments could evolve from a 
device for PR and R&D towards a device that will start the bandwagon of increasing 
adoption of EVs and eventually this could lead to a shift of the technological system. 
Alignment through technological nexus 
Activities both in the Netherlands and California have led to the formation of new 
actors and networks and some actors take on a new identity. CALSTART, Synergy 
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and the Dutch steering committee are examples of new networks. The electric 
utilities in California changed their identity through the acceptance of a new role of 
intermediate between market and technology development of the development. 
These new actors appear to be of vital importance for the development of niches 
through experiments and promotion of a market of early promises through 
regulation. Niches and markets need maintenance and sponsors that are prepared to 
act on behalf on the new constituency that is built around the EV. This is what 
CALSTART, Synergy and others provided. They are interested in the process of 
introduction and act on the metalevel as introduction champions. They create 
coupling between variation and selection which is of crucial importance for 
successful shifting of technological systems, as a quasi-evolutionary model would 
predict. 
Conclusion 
All three strategies discussed appear to have their own strengths and weaknesses. 
When used in the right combination they could reinforce each other. Technology 
forcing could lead to innovation. Some preconditions have to be fulfilled: political 
support is needed and governments need to follow a fail-soft strategy. The major 
drawback of a technology-forcing approach is that it may end in a fight between 
industry and government. Experiments could help avoid this. They provide space for 
working towards constructive solutions and articulating developments in many 
directions covering both technology and elements of the selection environment. 
Thus experiments could help fine-tune the effects of technology forcing. Finally, if 
governments are the only ones who attempt to bring alternatives to the market, they 
are bound to fail. Other actors need to join their course and in particular new actors 
who could serve as a technological nexus are needed to come about. A 
technological nexus provides amplification of the first two routes and we would 
argue are of crucial importance for the sustaining of the new world generated by 
experiments and technology forcing. This new EV world looks fascinating and 
provides hot news for newspapers and magazines. Their stability is not yet 
guaranteed. Irreversibility could evolve but is not assured. 
The groundwork for shifting technological systems can be prepared. The 
outcome, an actual shift, depends on a coming together of a complex set of factors 
and actors and many interactions which cannot be predicted. They can be 
organized, though, if one sees the process of introduction and change as a joint 
learning process driven by interactions on a market of early promises. 
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